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Abstract 
 
 
In An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, John Locke argues against the claim that there are 
innate ideas. His arguments consisted in the denial of universal assent, the incoherency of innate ideas, 
and the formation of principles by inductive means. In this paper, I attempt to show why these arguments 
do not work in showing that there are no innate ideas and also propose and defend Gottfried Leibniz’s 
model of dispositional innatism — the claim that we are born with at least innate dispositions or 
tendencies to have particular beliefs. I use the ordinary conception of memories as a proper analogy for 
how innate ideas can exist in a mind even without the agent being aware of them, as well as how those 
ideas may vary in degree of innateness in the context of being dispositions. I then end by defending the 
claim that we are innately disposed to believe in a mind-independent world, despite there being prima 
facie contrary evidence from Jean Piaget’s stages of development in his work on child psychology. 
Consequentially, this will allow for further exploration into what innate dispositions, in general, would 
entail in the development of minds and belief-forming for human beings. 
 
 
 
 
Introduction 
 
Innatism is the position which holds that human beings are born with innate ideas. 
Leibniz had defended a position that affirms a particular form of innatism, what one 
may call dispositional innatism. His work New Essays on Human Understanding was 
written as a response to Locke’s An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, in which 
Locke puts forth arguments for his belief that all of our knowledge is attained via our 
experience and that the human mind at birth is a tabula rasa, a blank slate void of any 
inborn ideas. It then follows that a refutation of Locke’s position only requires that one 
prove the existence at least one innate idea. It remains worthwhile, however, to 
examine and evaluate Locke’s arguments against innatism as well as Leibniz’s own 
responses to them. In addition, it will be explored how a priori truths and beliefs 
without evidence pose a problem for Locke, how Leibniz’s dispositional innatism may 
provide a more plausible view of the mind, and how the concept of memories may 
serve as an appropriate analogy for the relationship between an agent and her innate 
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ideas. The model for innate dispositions will also be further developed in response to an 
empirical objection to the claim that belief in a mind-independent world is 
dispositionally innate. 
 
Universal Consent and Locke’s Attack on Innatism 
 
Locke’s argument against innatism begins with an evaluation of one of the fundamental 
principles of innate ideas: the principle of universal consent. Locke appears to make an 
accurate distinction between two possible types of relationships that innate ideas may 
have with the principle of universal consent. He writes that the argument from universal 
consent fails in that “if it were true in matter of fact, that there were certain [innate] 
truths, wherein all mankind agreed, it would not prove them innate”.1 Here, Locke is 
justifiably rejecting that universal consent in an idea is a sufficient condition for that 
idea being innate. This, of course, is to be distinguished from the claim that universal 
consent is a necessary condition of any idea being innate, which Locke himself believes 
to be true.2 Given that Locke himself believed that there is no universal assent among 
beliefs, it follows that he would not affirm the existence of innate ideas. Quite fittingly, 
Locke uses empirical means to support his claim that there is no universal assent, by 
noting that there are many humans, namely children and the mentally impaired, who do 
not have any knowledge or thoughts concerning principles which are typically 
considered to be innate. In addition, Locke acknowledges a response claiming that 
while children may appear to lack knowledge of these principles, these principles 
remain innate as they are “imprinted on the soul”, and the children are merely not 
aware of them yet. Locke, however, finds this odd as it seems to him “near a 
contradiction, to say, that there are truths imprinted on the soul, which it perceives or 
understands not”.3 While Locke concedes that one’s capacity to discover these 
principles are innate, he asserts that this does not entail that the knowledge that one 
discovers is itself innate, but rather he believes that this knowledge is ultimately 
dependent on one’s experience. To appeal to one’s capacity or potential to discover 
these principles as reason to believe that these principles are innate themselves is 
problematic, Locke suggests. If one were to do so, then there would be “no difference 
between the maxims of the mathematicians, and the theorems they deduce from them,” 
since both would be innate and attainable through the use of reason.4 This of course is 
strange to suggest, however, since it seems as though the theorems would have to be 
less accessible than the maxims or principles they are deduced from, which would 
make it odd to categorize both as being equally innate. According to Locke, this move 
                                                          
1 Locke, John. An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, ed. by Peter H. Nidditch Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1975. Book 1 Ch.2 §3. 
2 To clarify, Locke is merely rejecting the conditional, “if an idea possesses universal assent, then 
that idea is an innate idea,” while affirming it’s converse, “if an idea is an innate idea, then that 
idea possesses universal assent.” 
3 Locke, An Essay Concerning Human Understanding. Book 1 Ch.2 §5. 
4 Locke, An Essay Concerning Human Understanding. Book 1 Ch.2 §8. 
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would also not avoid the charge of contradiction made earlier, as it would still hold that 
before the use of reason, it would be said that one would know and not know these 
innate principles at the same time. Locke also argues that children do not know 
mathematical or logical truths without the understanding of the ideas or words 
concerning those truths. Further, children seem to learn of these principles through 
inductive means, such that they would know the proposition (to use Locke’s example) 
“that an apple is not fire” through observation, before recognizing the principle which 
states that “it is impossible for the same thing to be, and not to be”.  
 
Leibniz’s Response 
 
While it’s certain that Leibniz himself believed that there is universal assent among 
what he calls to be innate principles, it seems as if he focused more upon Locke’s 
suggestion that a belief in the existence of innate ideas would entail a contradiction; 
namely that before attaining knowledge of the “innate” principles, one would both 
know and not know of those principles if they were indeed innate. Leibniz correctly 
recognizes a gaping flaw within Locke’s argument however. Leibniz notes that before 
Locke came to his logical contradiction in proper form, in that it is both true that these 
innate principles could be known yet not be known, Locke had previously stated the 
claim of the innatists that one may be unaware of the innate principles in his or her 
mind before those principles are discovered and known. But it should be pointed out 
that in order for Locke to make the assertion that it is a contradiction, he must affirm 
that having an idea in one’s mind is equivalent to that agent knowing that idea, so that it 
may be said that the agent both knows and does not know that idea. However, as 
Leibniz recognizes, it is possible that one’s mind may possess an innate idea that the 
agent has no knowledge of. It is this which is implied when one makes the claim that an 
innate idea may exist in the minds of individuals who are not yet aware of them. To 
satisfy this claim, Leibniz puts forth his own examples of such ideas, as he suggests that 
there are habits and memories that people may possess, but are nevertheless unaware 
of.5 While an ordinary person may use empirical means to try help himself remember 
where he had left his keys, he only uses his senses and observations as ways to “jog up” 
his own memory, as if the location of his keys was somewhere hidden in his mind and 
that he was merely attempting to search his own mind for that memory. Therefore, 
there seems to be no reason why there wouldn’t be an idea within the mind which one 
is not aware of. In his critique that children do not know mathematical or logical truths 
without the understanding of the ideas or words concerning those truths, it seems as 
though Locke is making another mistake, as it is clear that while children may not have 
knowledge of the syntax involved in mathematics and logic, it does not follow that they 
would not possess the semantic truths that those syntactic notions and words try to 
convey. While it’s possible that a child knows of the proposition “an apple is not fire” 
                                                          
5 Leibniz, Gottfried Wilhelm. New Essays on Human Understanding, ed. and trans. by Peter 
Remnant and Jonathan Bennett. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996. Preface 52. 
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before knowing the principle, explicitly stated, of which the proposition is based upon, 
it is still the case that the child must use the principle, and so it must be said that the 
child has at least indirect knowledge of the principle used. Leibniz had a similar 
response, as he suggested it possible that people use innate principles even if they aren’t 
aware that they are using them.6 
 
A Priori Truths and Beliefs Without Evidence 
 
When reflecting upon what are considered to be non-empirical beliefs, such as a priori 
truths or beliefs without evidence, it should be clear to one that Locke has a significant 
issue when it comes to accounting for all ideas on the basis of empiricism, especially 
considering he has motivations for suggesting that we can have knowledge of 
mathematics and logic, as well as knowledge of God’s existence. The very nature of a 
priori truths asserts that they are capable of being discovered independent of 
experience. Now it may be proposed that simple mathematical truths still require 
experience to learn the terms applied to mathematical concepts, but as it has already 
been shown, this does not entail that a person does not possess the semantical truths 
concerning the principles used to discover other truths. Locke’s empiricist account fails 
to refute the innatist position, for it seems possible still that one could have possession 
of certain truths before any experience at all, since there are certain truths that are 
attainable independent of experience. In addition, it seems as though Locke failed to 
account for the majority of the a priori truths which are necessary. Leibniz recognized 
this problem as well, as he claimed that necessary truths are accessible to both our own 
understanding and experience but their origin must be from our own minds, since one 
would not be able to be certain that some truths are necessary by mere inductive 
reasoning.7 Similarly, as Robert Adams noted, since Locke’s method of proof is of 
course an empirical method, it seems impossible that he ever could be certain that there 
are no innate ideas. Adams states that “if his only justification for the empiricist 
principle is that he has not found any idea that fails to satisfy it, then the principle 
stands in danger of being refuted.”8 It then seems as though using inductive means to 
account for necessary truths or to argue for the non-existence of innate ideas, at best, 
makes each undecidable like the validity of statements in first-order logic. It also is the 
case that Locke’s disregard for innatism appears to be incompatible with some of the 
beliefs he holds. J.L. Mackie himself critiqued Locke’s insistence that theological, 
ethical, and geometrical truths can be demonstrated empirically with certainty.9 Perhaps 
it’s clear that Locke’s belief that there are no innate ideas would be more fitting with 
the beliefs of someone like Mackie, an atheist famous for his belief that there exists no 
                                                          
6 Leibniz, New Essays on Human Understanding. Book I Ch. i 84. 
7 Leibniz, New Essays on Human Understanding. Book I ch. i 75, 80. 
8 Adams, Robert Merrihew. “Where Do Our Ideas Come From?”, in Innate Ideas, ed. by Stephen 
P. Stich. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1975. 85. 
9 Mackie, J. L. Problems from Locke. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1976. Ch.7. 
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objective morality in his magnum opus, Ethics: Inventing Right and Wrong. Locke’s 
empiricist account fails to explain how one could come to know that God exists or that 
there are objective moral truths, as well as how people come to believe in such things 
without evidence.   
 
Leibniz and Hercules 
 
While a case has been made against Locke’s tabula rasa, it remains to be asked how 
innate ideas would fare, if it is indeed true that they exist. Since it seems rather strange 
to suggest that the ideas themselves are directly implanted in the mind, perhaps it is 
better to explore a less radical form of innatism. One such form is that of Leibniz’s 
dispositional innatism. Leibniz paints a picture in his New Essays, representing truth as 
the shape of Hercules from a block of marble. Leibniz explains that if our minds were 
merely blank tablets, then we would have no reason to believe that the block of marble 
would necessarily take on the shape of Hercules, rather than any other shape. However, 
he claims that “if there were veins in the block which marked out the shape of Hercules 
rather than other shapes, then that block would be more determined to that shape and 
Hercules would be innate in it.”10 Here, Leibniz is suggesting that innate ideas are 
innate by virtue of being dispositions and tendencies that human beings are born with. 
We are more disposed to hold particular beliefs, just as the block of marble, with its 
cracks or “veins”, is more disposed to take on the shape of Hercules. While Locke 
acknowledged that human beings are born with the capacity to reason, dispositional 
innatism goes further as it maintains that some of our beliefs would not be ultimately 
dependent on our experience. Some beliefs, such as beliefs in logical truths or in the 
existence of God and a material world, are rather “built-in” in a sense, as we are 
predetermined or predisposed to arrive at those beliefs. With these dispositions, Leibniz 
had written that our minds have a “special affinity” with innate principles.  
 
Memories, Degrees of Innateness, and Quasi-Universal Assent 
 
In making use of Leibniz’s example of memories, which had shown that there may be 
ideas in our minds that we are unaware of, it can be demonstrated how one of Locke’s 
arguments makes a faulty assumption. I’ve made note of Locke’s claim that the 
existence of innate ideas is dubious as it would make “no difference between the 
maxims of the mathematicians, and the theorems they deduce from them,” since both 
are claimed to be innate despite maxims being more easily attainable than the theorems 
deduced from the. Here, however, Locke is making the assumption that all innate ideas 
are equally innate. This is by no means evident, and by analogy, it may be proposed 
that these ideas may vary in innateness as it is common to think of memories possessing 
varying degrees of memorableness. For example, it is easier to recall of more recent 
memories than that of older memories, and it is easier to recall of eventful memories 
                                                          
10 Leibniz, New Essays on Human Understanding. Preface 52. 
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than it is to recall ordinary memories. This can serve as a possible model to show that 
mathematical maxims are more easily attainable than the theorems deduced from them 
even if they are both innate. To use Leibniz’s Hercules analogy, perhaps the ideas with 
higher degrees of innateness have more “veins” or cracks in the marble than those with 
lesser degrees of innateness, such that one is more pre-disposed to believe in the former 
than the latter. This may entail that either “higher” innate dispositions are more likely to 
be manifested than the “lesser” innate dispositions, or that they just manifest 
themselves earlier than the “lesser” innate dispositions.  
 
It must be also explained why there appears to be a lack of universal assent in ideas that 
are often claimed to be innate. I propose this is due to the ability of humans to reject 
their own innate ideas or dispositions at some point of maturity in their lives. This may 
be comparable to how humans have sometimes shut out traumatic memories so much to 
the point that they no longer possess the memories they once had. Likewise, it is 
possible for humans to reject and remove themselves from the innate dispositions they 
once had. Let’s suppose that if there are these innate dispositions, then the disposition 
to believe in the existence of a material world would be one of them. It seems strange to 
suggest that the idealist George Berkeley was an immaterialist even as a child. More 
plausibly, he only came to believe the world to be entirely mind-dependent by rejecting 
the belief he held as a child. Namely, he had rejected the belief in a material world that 
he was innately disposed to believe in. Therefore, the innatist should not be troubled by 
a lack of universal assent in beliefs held by mature individuals. It now appears as if 
innatism only requires that there is at least universal assent in some of the beliefs that 
humans are first disposed to, rather than requiring that there is universal assent in some 
beliefs of humans throughout the entire span of their lives. This leaves us with just 
quasi-universal assent as an essential property of a belief we are innate disposed to 
hold.  
 
Objection: Piaget, Object Permanence, and Withholding Belief11 
 
I will now address an objection that has been raised concerning the Berkelyeian case I 
had constructed. My hope is not only to propose a solution to the problem but also to 
expand further upon how these innate dispositions would function within the mental 
development of human beings. By use of Piaget’s famous stages of development in 
psychology, one may contest the claim I’ve made concerning George Berkeley being 
innately disposed to believe in a mind-independent world even though he had not 
believed so later on in his life. In his studies, Piaget claimed that children do not 
acquire object permanence — the ability to know that an object still exists when it is 
                                                          
11 The following section was added to this paper after the objection was raised by an 
undergraduate from UCSB (my apologies for my inability to recall her name) during the Q&A 
session of my presentation of this paper at the 2017 Pacific University Undergraduate Philosophy 
Conference. 
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not seen — until around the age of eight months.12 The objector here would note that 
Berkeley, like any other child, would not have come to believe in a mind-independent 
world before believing that objects do not exist once they disappear from one’s sight. 
Therefore, belief in a mind-independent world is not something we are innately 
disposed to possess. 
 
The objector, however, fails in this regard: There is nothing in those experiments that 
would entail that these children deny the existence of a mind-independent world before 
the age of eight months. While Piaget only insists that children acquire belief in a mind-
independent world after eight months but not necessarily that they had believed the 
contrary beforehand.  There may be a difference here between merely withholding 
belief and rejecting that belief, even within the concept of a dispositionally innate 
belief. This may be expressed as the following: 
 
Let p represent a proposition that subject S is disposed to believe in. This entails 
that when first arriving to a position at which S must believe in either p or not-p, 
p’s negation, S will believe p. However, this does not entail that S always 
believed in p. It may be the case that before arriving to said position, S did not 
outright reject p by believing not-p, but rather by withholding belief from both, 
such that S believed neither p nor not-p.  
 
One may compare this to a person lacking an opinion on an issue that the person has no 
knowledge of. A person, who has no knowledge of the issue of abortion or even of 
what abortion is, would most likely not commit to either the affirmative or negative 
position regarding the moral permissibility of abortion. Once the person gains 
substantive knowledge regarding the issue, perhaps then it would be appropriate for the 
person to place belief in one of the two positions. While it may be the case that one of 
either p or not-p must be true, there seems to be no restriction or limit, epistemically, 
for a person to have to believe in either one of those options, especially when it comes 
to matters he or she has no knowledge of. As it pertains to belief, the person can take on 
a third option, which is to believe in neither p nor not-p. We can now attempt to 
properly define what it would mean for a belief to be derived from an innate 
disposition. A definition may be as follows: 
 
x is a belief humans are innately disposed to iff humans, if in the position to 
believe either x or its negation, would first believe x before ever having believed 
its negation.  
 
It’s worthy to note that, as already addressed with the proposed quasi-universal assent, 
a person may later reject a belief he was innately disposed to have. This working 
definition allows for such to happen, and it also allows for there to be a period before 
                                                          
12 Piaget, Jean. The Psychology of Intelligence. Totowa, New Jersey: Littlefield Adams.1963. 
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acquiring the belief one is innately disposed to have, in which one holds neither that 
belief nor the opposing belief. To not believe in something is not necessarily to believe 
in the contrary. An infant, before acquiring object permanence, perhaps does not have 
ability to full grasp or understand the concept of an external object being perceived by 
one’s mind. In fact, Piaget’s studies show that object permanence is only possible once 
the infant gains the ability to form mental representations of objects in the mind when 
the objects are no longer in sight.13 The acquisition of this ability is the point at which 
the infant first has the option to believe in mind-independent objects, and if that is a 
belief the infant is innately disposed to possess, then that will naturally be the case. 
Therefore, it still is consistent to suggest that we have innate dispositions to hold 
particular beliefs, even if those beliefs are acquired after birth and are rejected at a later, 
more mature point in one’s life. 
 
Conclusion 
 
 It has now been put forth how John Locke’s arguments fail in refuting innatism and 
why the existence of innate ideas, or rather innate dispositions, is more plausible than 
suggesting that our ideas and knowledge are attained exclusively from experience. A 
possible model utilizing Leibniz’s analogy and the ordinary conception of memories 
has also been proposed to show how a person’s mind may possess innate principles 
without the person being aware of them, as well as how ideas formed from innate 
dispositions may differ in their “degree” of innateness. An objection from Piaget’s 
stages of development was also made against the existence of an innate disposition to 
believe in a mind-independent world, which yielded a response concerning the role of 
innate dispositions in the mental development of children, providing a coherent solution 
to defend belief in a mind-independent world as a belief we’re innately disposed to 
possess.14  
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